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In this paper we study the agricultural trade impacts of the Canada Chile Free Trade Agreement 
(CCFTA). We find that the effect of the CCFTA on Chilean agricultural exports to Canada is 
large and positive. We estimate that approximately one-half of a 90 percent increase in Chilean 
exports to Canada can be attributed to trade preferences that the country received under the 
agreement. We found no effect of the agreement on Canadian exports to Chile. As far as we 
know, our paper is among the few that carries out a detailed empirical analysis of \ the effect of 
the FTA on agriculture. Most empirical papers that have studied the trade impact of FTAs rely 
on country-wide gravity models and aggregate trade data. These aggregate analyses can hide 
negative effects of FTAs on some sectors (like agriculture) where a country may have a 
comparative disadvantage. Our approach is industry-focused and differs from the mainstream 
literature analyzing FTAs. 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recently we have seen an exponential growth of trading partnerships.1 Across the world,
long standing barriers have been broken down. Relatively closed economies like Japan and
Korea, have announced negotiations for bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Distant
neighbors such as New Zealand and Singapore have forged ahead with trade negotiations.
Countries, in Asia and Latin America are increasingly strengthening their trade ties.
In response to the increase in FTA’s across the world the US and Canada are also building
trading relationships across the world. The US has 15 bilateral, and 6 regional agreements
in place.2 Of these agreements 7 were signed recently (from 2004-2007) by the Bush
Government. Canada has FTA’s with the US, Mexico, Israel, Chile, and Costa Rica. Recently
Canada signed the Canada-European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) in January 2008, an
FTA with Peru in May 2008, and an FTA with Colombia in June 2008.3 Canada is also
in the process of negotiating additional FTAs with a number of other partners, such as
Singapore, Korea, the FTA of the Americas, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and
the Dominican Republic.4
In this paper we study the Canada-Chile Free trade Agreement (CCFTA). The CCFTA
was signed in Santiago on December 5 1996 and came into force on July 5, 1997. It im-
1 Since 1995 over 245 trade arrangements have been notiﬁed to the WTO (www.wto.org).
2 Partner Countries: Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman,
Panama, Peru, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea.
3 The Canada - European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was signed on 26-Jan-2008, and Canada - Peru
Free Trade Agreement was signed on 29-May-2008. As of June 7, 2008, Canada has also concluded free trade
agreement (FTA) negotiations with Colombia.
4 F o rm o r ei n f o r m a t i np l e a s es e et h eF o r e i g nA ﬀairs and International Trade Canada website:
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/reg-en.asp.
1mediately eliminated 75 percent of bilateral tariﬀs, with most of the remaining tariﬀsb e i n g
gradually phased out. The agreement largely follows the NAFTA, in that - besides bilateral
trade liberalization - it also contains parallel provisions on investment protection, a mutual
exemption from anti-dumping measures and on labor and environmental standards. An anal-
ysis of the CCFTA is useful for insights beyond the CCFTA. Canada has recently signed two
other FTA’s (with Colombia and Peru) modeled on the NAFTA. Analyzing the CCFTA will
help us understand the impacts of FTA’s with Colombia and Peru as well.5
We focus on the agricultural trade impacts of the CCFTA. The CCFTA also provides
the immediate or gradual elimination of tariﬀs for most products in the agricultural sector.
It immediately eliminated 69 percent of tariﬀs set by Canada and 44 percent of tariﬀss e t
by Chile, and for most other products tariﬀs were to be phased out gradually.6 We focus
on agriculture as this sector is often a sticking point in most trade agreements. This is
borne out by the observation that most FTAs around the world contain special provisions
for agriculture. Sometimes segments of the agriculture sector are entirely excluded from
trade liberalization. Consider the US-Australia FTA as an example. This FTA requires no
change in the U.S. MFN above-quota tariﬀ on dairy products, and also requires no change
in Australia’s quota access for sugar. Similarly, the CCFTA also allows both countries to
maintain the application of tariﬀs for quantities exceeding respective quotas for diary, poultry
and egg products.
To study the agricultural trade impact of this FTA, we use a gravity model to predict
5 This analysis will probably provide the best predicton of the agricultural impacts of these agreements
for the next few years before the data required to anlalyze these FTA’s becomes available.
6 35 percent of Canadian HS6 categories are exempt from tariﬀ reductions and 22 percent
of Chilean. This information is gathered from the Agriculture and Agrifood Canada web site:
http://www.agr.gc.ca/misb/itpd/english/trade_agr/ccfta.htm.
2the eﬀect of tariﬀ cuts on trade ﬂows. The gravity model is a well received robust model
for predicting trade patterns across countries. It explains bilateral trade ﬂows that are
based on the distance between the trading partners, and demand measured by economic
mass (GDP, GDP per capita etc.). The model can include an array of variables to account
for other determinants of trade like exchange rates, common language, connecting borders,
treaties and other trade policies. We ﬁnd a large and positive eﬀect of CCFTA on Chilean
agricultural exports to Canada. Controlling for the diﬀerences in comparative advantage
in producing agricultural products, like diﬀerences in incomes, exchange rates and other
characteristics, we estimate that approximately one-half of a 90 percent increase in Chilean
exports to Canada can be attributed to trade preferences that the country received under
the agreement. On the other hand, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of the agreement on Canadian exports
to Chile. To account for the more prolonged phase out period for Chilean tariﬀ reductions,
we estimate the elasticity of Canadian and Chilean bilateral trade volumes with respect
to tariﬀ changes proposed by CCFTA. The results from this section further support the
ﬁnding that it was mostly Chilean exporters who beneﬁted from CCFTA tariﬀ cuts, while
Canadian agricultural producers did not respond to more export opportunities created by
the agreement.
The main contribution of this paper is to draw attention to the impact of FTA on Cana-
dian agriculture trade. Most empirical papers that have studied the trade impact of FTAs
rely on country-wide gravity models and aggregate trade data. This provides overall trade
eﬀects of an FTA, and can hide negative eﬀects of FTAs on some sectors (like agriculture)
where a country may have comparative disadvantage. Our approach is industry-focused and
3diﬀers from the mainstream literature analyzing FTAs. As far as we know, our paper is
among the ﬁrst few that carries out a detailed empirical analysis of the eﬀect of FTA on
agriculture.7
This study is also timely given the news of new FTA’s being signed by US and Canada
and the long list of pending negotiations. It informs a debate on whether countries should
sign or negotiate further FTAs (Becker, 2001). Many of these studies ask, what is the eﬀect of
an FTA on overall bilateral trade, and whether both partners beneﬁt from these agreements
in terms of ‘trade creation.’ As mentioned earlier, not many studies take a more detailed
look at the eﬀect of an FTA speciﬁcally on agricultural industries.
We structure this paper as follows. In subsection 1.1, we describe the bilateral trade
between Canada and Chile and the changing patterns over time. In section 2, we provide a
brief literature review. In section 3, we describe in detail the methodology and the various
econometric models used to analyze the impact of CCFTA, and present the results. We
conclude in section 4.
1.1 Canada-Chile Trade
The Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement provides immediate elimination of tariﬀsf o rm o s t
products. It immediately eliminated 69 percent of tariﬀs set by Canada and 44 percent of
tariﬀs set by Chile, and for most other products tariﬀs were to be phased out gradually. The
grace period for most sensitive products, in the Canadian tariﬀ schedule, was set between 5
to 10 years with the exception of beef, sugar and milling wheat, cases in which tariﬀsw e r e
7 Others that have studied the eﬀect of trade agreements on agriculture trade have done so for speciﬁc
subsectors (Vollrath and co-authors (2006)) or have concentrated on other issues like transprtation costs
(Prentice et al (1998)) or border eﬀects.
4meant to be phased out in 15 to 17 years.8 For diary, poultry and egg products both
countries maintain the application of tariﬀs for quantities exceeding a certain quota.
Canadian imports from Chile have been increasing since the FTA was signed. Imports
grew by 86 percent between 1996 and 2004 and almost doubled by 2005 (Table 1). Chile’s
share of the Canadian import market has also been growing over the past 11 years, it increased
by 33 percent, one of the largest increases among all South American countries. This growth
has varied across diﬀerent products: Chilean exports to Canada increased the most in edible
fruits, but also in areas such as beverages, cereals and ﬁsh products (Table 2). This is not
surprising since most of these categories are characterized by immediate elimination of all
tariﬀs upon implementation of CCFTA.
As for the advantages aﬀorded by the CCFTA to the Canadian exporters of agricultural
products to Chile, the situation looks very diﬀerent, as Figure 1 shows. The total value of
Canadian exports to Chile decreased by 60 percent until 2004 and by almost 66 percent by
2006, from around $165 million to just over $55 million at the end of the period. As Table 1
shows, Canadian exports uniformly declined with respect to most Latin American partners,
while the growth with the rest of the world stayed strong. One of the most dramatic decreases
in Canadian exports to Chile, post 1996, was for exports of cereals, from around $150 million
to less than $34 million. This sub-sector in fact can be seen to drive the overall decrease, due
to its overwhelming share of the total: cereals account for over 90 percent of total Canadian
agricultural exports to Chile, with the proportion decreasing to just over 60 percent in 2006,
back to its 1992 levels. On the other hand many other product categories have been areas
8 Source: Agriculture and Agrifood Canada web site http://www.agr.gc.ca/misb/itpd/english/trade_agr/ccfta.htm.)
5of growth for Canadian exporters in the Chilean market after the signing of the CCFTA.
However, even very substantial increases (from 1000 percent to more than 8000 percent) in
exports of products such as oil seeds, medicinal plants (HS12), preparations of cereals, bread
and pastry (HS19), and products of the milling industry (HS11) could not compensate for
the overall decline ( Table 2).
The exporters of edible vegetables beneﬁt the most from the agreement, both in terms
of growth and in absolute terms, which may be the outcome of speedy tariﬀ reductions
completed by 2001. At the same time, exporters of other products that received wide tariﬀ
preferences under the agreement, such as manufacturers of cereal, tobacco products, edible
fruits, prepared vegetables, and miscellaneous edible products did not seem to beneﬁt.
2 Related Literature
Many studies have looked at the trade impact of FTAs on member countries. The majority
of empirical research analyzes trade eﬀects of FTAs using the gravity model.9 Frankel
and Wei (1993, 1995), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995),
Malhotra (2007), Freund (2000), Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2001) analyzed trade creation
and diversion eﬀects for diﬀerent FTAs using gravity models. The majority of previous
studies found both trade creation and trade diversion for most major FTAs (EU, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, AFTA, EFTA, CER). However, the magnitude of trade creation and diversion
9 These studies use the concept of trade creation and trade diversion as conceptualized by Viner (1950).
The trade creation eﬀect is a result of removal of trade barriers, in case the member of PTAs were natural
partners - the removal of trade barriers generally lead to trade creation within the block. The trade diversion
eﬀect would arise if the countries within the trading block (PTA) replace trade from countries outside the
trading block. This generally happens because the lowering of trade barriers gives member countries a chance
to sell their goods cheaper than the non- member countries purely due to the removal of trade barriers, trade
is diverted away from non-member countries that had the natural comparative advantage.
6eﬀects varies substantially across studies. Cernat (2001) considered many FTAs, and found
that some were trade creating (AFTA, EU, SADC and COMESA) while others were trade
diverting (MERCOSUR and Andean Community). For the EU, he estimated 20 percent
trade creation measured as a share of total EU imports, while for the NAFTA the results are
mixed. Frankel and Wei (1995) report 15 percent trade creation for the EU and found no
evidence of trade diversion for the period 1972-92. The above literature highlights diﬀerences
across FTAs in its eﬀect on trade, and emphasizes the need to analyze each FTA individually.
A large number of papers starting with McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1998), Hillberry
(1998), Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) assess the eﬀects of borders for the bilateral trade
ﬂows between FTA partners and conclude that borders matter. Regarding the particular
issue of agricultural trade, Furtan and Van Melle (2004) estimate the border eﬀects of trade
in agricultural products between Canada and its NAFTA partners: US and Mexico between
1992 and 1998. The authors conclude that the non-tariﬀ frictions in Canada-US agricultural
trade are signiﬁcant (Furtan and van Melle (2004)).
Vollrath and coauthors (2006) adopt a gravity approach when they analyze trade in
processed and staple agri-food products among a wide cross-section of 69 countries biennially
from 1996 to 2002. Among others, they ﬁnd that diﬀerences in per capita income aﬀect trade
in manufactured food but not trade in commodity foods, that is consistent with the HO
theory of international trade - the land/labor ratio is an important determinant of trade in
food products and that the EU, NAFTA and MERCOSUR have all increased the intra-bloc
trade in food products beyond that which would have taken place in the counterfactual. In a
more specialized study focusing on Canadian pork exports to the US market, Prentice et. al.
7(1998) use a gravity inter-regional trade model - which they compare to a derived demand
for transportation - to estimate the potential to increase exports in various local markets in
the US. Their main ﬁnding is that the volume of exports is highly elastic with respect to
transportation costs.
In our study we look at what happens to Canada’s agricultural trade from signing the
CCFTA. All studies on FTA’s in our literature review rely on country-wide gravity model
and aggregate trade data hence, ignoring the eﬀect of FTAs on agriculture. The other set
of literature carries out more specialized analysis and concentrates on a few sub-sectors
within the agriculture sector. where as we focus on all the subsectors within the agricultural
sector. Also, we use both a gravity model, as is common for studying FTAs, and actual tariﬀ
reduction data in the second model.
3 Data, Methodology and Results
Trade data for this study comes from the Statistics Canada database. It covers bilateral
industry-level trade data between Canada and 196 other countries including Chile. The
data is collected at 6-digit Harmonized System (HS6) industry classiﬁcation. The analysis
uses data for agricultural industries (HS1-HS24) and covers 800 commodity categories for
the period from 1988 to 2005. The data on country-level macroeconomic variables such as
GDP, exchange rate, interest rate and price levels, is taken from the International Financial
Statistics database maintained by the International Monetary Fund. Geographical variables
have been obtained from the World Bank COMTRADE database.
Before the agreement came into force, Chile imposed a uniform ad-valorem tariﬀ rate
of 11 percent for all imported products, and the main target of CCFTA is to remove these
8tariﬀ barriers. The liberalization of Chilean market for Canadian agricultural exports was
phased out over several years starting from 1997. Chilean tariﬀs will be gradually removed
in three years for 1.8 percent of HS6 headings, in six years for 32.7 percent, in eleven years
for 37.9 percent and in sixteen to eighteen years for 4.2 percent. At the same time, 22.1
percent of HS6 headings are not covered by CCFTA, and the 11 percent ad-valorem tariﬀ
will be preserved for those products. On the other hand, the liberalization of the Canadian
agricultural market for Chilean products was scheduled over a substantially shorter period:
import tariﬀs on 65 percent of all agricultural HS6 categories were completely removed by
2003, while the rest (35 percent) were exempt from tariﬀ elimination provisions. Data on
Chilean tariﬀ preferences for Canada under the trade agreement is taken from Agriculture
and Agri-Food Canada database.
In this section we talk about the several econometric approaches we employ to examine
the eﬀect of CCFTA on Canadian agricultural trade with Chile. We start with the standard
a p p r o a c hp r o p o s e di nt h el i t e r a t u re for measuring trade policy eﬀects on trade ﬂows. This
approach is based on a standard gravity-type equation, which explains the natural logarithm
of one country’s imports with the level of income in its trading partner country and the log
of pairwise distance. This speciﬁcation is augmented with a number of other geographic and
economic variables to account for other possible trade factors. The list includes a binary
variable for a common language to capture cultural proximity, a set of geographic variables
(binary variables for island and landlocked status of a partner country) to control for variation
in trade costs. Since the gravity model was designed for explaining the value of bilateral trade
and is not suited for modelling industry-level trade ﬂows, the economic size of the country
9may not be a good explanatory variable for agricultural trade, which in a larger extent
depends on a country’s comparative advantage. For this reason, we included three variables
to capture the country’s comparative advantage in producing agricultural products: the total
land area used in the agricultural sector, the share of agricultural land per worker, and the
amount of fertilizer used in agricultural sector (grams per square kilometer) to capture the
technology advantage. We also control for the variation in the exchange rate since it is
an important determinant of a country’s export supply and demand, given the exogenous
agricultural trade balance with each country. The set of year eﬀects (time dummies) account
for global business cycles, eﬀects of multilateral trade liberalization, oil shocks, etc. The
exact speciﬁcation takes the following form:
ln(Xict)=β0 + β1PCi + β2FTAit + β3ERit + β4 ln(Yit)+
+β5Fit + β6ALi + β7ALWi + β8 ln(Di)+β9ComLangi+
+β10Llockedi + β11Islandi + βT [Ye a rEffe c t s ]+εict,
(1)
where i denotes trading partner country, c denotes industry and t denotes time. Variable
Xict is the value of Canadian exports or imports of industry c from country i at year t, Yit
and ERit are nominal GDP and nominal exchange rate of country i at year t, respectively,10
Fit, ALi and ALWi are the amount of fertilizer intensity, the size of cultivated land and the
size of cultivated land per worker, respectively. Di is the distance between the home country
and country i. Finally, ComLangi, Llockedi,a n dIslandi are binary variables that take
value of one if country i speaks either English of French, is landlocked or an island nation,
respectively.
10 The exchange rate is measured in the units of foreign currecny per one Canadian dollar.
10Variable PCi is a partner country dummy variable that takes the value of one when
partner country is Chile to control for possible pre-FTA diﬀerences in trade patterns relative
to other countries, and FTAit is an interaction of PCi and a time-speciﬁc dummy variable
for Canada-Chile FTA. Coeﬃcient β1 measures how much greater is Canadian imports from
(exports to) Chile relative to imports from (exports to) the average Canadian trading part-
ner. Coeﬃcient β2 is of key importance in the analysis: it measures the trade eﬀect of the
Canada-Chile FTA on the (log) level of Canadian exports to and imports from Chile. A
Positive and signiﬁcant β2 would indicate a trade-creating eﬀect of the FTA for Canadian
agricultural sector, while insigniﬁcant values would suggest that the FTA creates no com-
petitive advantage for Canadian agricultural exporters to Chile relative to other countries.
Speciﬁcation (1) is estimated with OLS where observations are clustered by country-
industry to obtain a robust covariance matrix adjusting for within-cluster correlation. Esti-
mation results for equation (1) are presented in Table 3 for Canadian imports and in Table
5f o re x p o r t s .W eﬁrst focus on the results for Canadian imports. In the basic speciﬁcation
without additional controls (column 1), the coeﬃc i e n te s t i m a t ef o rβ1 is positive, which im-
plies that Canada already exported 39 percent more to Chile than to the average country
during the period 1988-1997.11 Adding the FTAvariable to the basic speciﬁcation suggests
that this eﬀect nearly doubled as a result of the FTA: the coeﬃcient β2 =0 .30 implies that
exports of the average Chilean agricultural sector to Canada increased by 35 percent as a
result of the agreement.
Including other controls in speciﬁcations (3)-(6) we observe that most coeﬃcients have
11 exp(0.33) − 1 ' 0.39
11the expected signs and are consistent with theoretical predictions. The negative coeﬃcients
on GDP and common language may look odd. However, keeping in mind that the dependent
variable is agricultural imports rather than total trade, larger GDP of a partner country may
indicate its comparative disadvantage in agriculture and as a result lower export intensity in
agricultural sectors. Similarly, countries that speak English or French may be specializing in
production of manufacturing goods. Positive and signiﬁcant estimates of β6 and β7 support
the main prediction of the Hecksher-Ohlin model that countries that are more endowed with
agricultural land will specialize in agricultural-land-intensive products and hence are more
likely to export to Canada. Countries that use more capital-intensive technologies also ex-
port more agricultural products to Canada, as reﬂected by positive coeﬃcient β5.I ti sa l s o
the case that countries that pay higher trade costs, such as more distant countries, island
countries and countries without sea access, trade less agricultural goods with Canada. These
traditional gravity parameters are economically meaningful and statistically signiﬁcant. Fi-
nally, appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the currency of a trading partner has
positive eﬀect on Canadian imports.
Overall, the main gravity model variables have sensible and statistically signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcients. Our central focus in this analysis is the pattern of Chilean imports from Canada.
Results from columns (3)-(6) provide further evidence on the trade creating eﬀects of CCFTA
for the Chilean agricultural industry. During the period 1997-2005, Canadian agricultural
imports from Chile became 23−34 percent larger than with the average country, controlling
for pre-CCFTA cross-country diﬀerences.
The results highlight the very strong eﬀect of CCFTA for Canadian imports from Chile
12relative to other countries. Table 4 reports the estimation results for speciﬁcation (1) with
diﬀerent control groups (group of countries as comparison). Table 4 only reports the co-
eﬃcient estimates on the FTA dummy (β2) for the equation with Canadian imports. We
diﬀerentiate the control group with respect to geographic area and income level, following
the World Bank classiﬁcation. Chilean agricultural exporters to Canada improved their per-
formance relative to those from richer countries with higher income levels. In particular, the
CCFTA improved the comparative advantage of Chilean agriculture relative to European,
East Asian, and, to some extent,12 Central and South American countries. At the same
time, Chile gained no trade advantage over countries with lower income level or African
countries. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that free trade agreements crowd
out the least productive competing importers, which are presumed to be concentrated in
high income countries with specialization in manufacturing goods.
T u r n i n gt ot h es p e c i ﬁcation with Canadian exports in Table 5, the results for the basic
speciﬁcations (1) and (2) show that Canadian agricultural exports to Chile prior to the FTA
were not substantially diﬀerent from that to the average country (insigniﬁcant β1). The
coeﬃcient β2 is also always insigniﬁcant, meaning that Canadian exports to Chile were not
aﬀected by the trade agreement. This result is robust to the inclusion of other variables
in columns (3) to (6). The coeﬃcient on GDP is positive and signiﬁcant, implying that
Canada sells more of its agricultural exports to larger countries. A positive coeﬃcient on
agricultural land area leads to the same conclusion. The eﬀect of the exchange rate on the
value of exports is positive, which implies that the appreciation of Canadian dollar tends
12 The coeﬃcient on ‘Central and South America’ dummie is the higher one but its large standard error
indicate high variance in this eﬀect across countries from comparative group.
13to reduce total exports. The estimated coeﬃcient on the amount of agricultural land per
worker (β7) is negative giving further support to the Hecksher-Ohlin theory: countries that
are relatively scarce in agricultural land endowment tend to import agricultural products
from other countries, and from Canada in particular. Consistent with the predictions of the
gravity model, the coeﬃcients on landlocked and island are positive.13
In general, the estimates of the modiﬁed gravity model are broadly consistent with the-
oretical predictions and we can use it to address the main question of the analysis: the
eﬀect of the CCFTA on the ﬂow of Canadian exports to Chile. Controlling for cross-country
diﬀerences, coeﬃcient β1 remains insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, prior to the
CCFTA Chilean agricultural imports from Canada were not statistically diﬀerent from the
average Chilean trade partner. Moreover, the coeﬃcient on the CCFTA dummy is always
insigniﬁcant, implying that the FTA had no eﬀect on the volume of Canadian agricultural
exports to Chile. Together with the previous result for Canadian imports, the main con-
clusion of the empirical analysis is that the CCFTA generated disproportionately higher
beneﬁts to producers from one member of the agreement, Chile, while Canadian producers
of agricultural products seem not to have beneﬁted.
A potential problem with speciﬁcation (1) is a possible endogeneity problem due to
correlation of PC and FTA dummies with the error term. Country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect
not captured by the list of country-speciﬁc variables may lead to the biased estimates of
the model parameters. In particular, we can think of technological diﬀerences, diﬀerences
in land quality, country-speciﬁc policies in support of agricultural sectors, etc. Presence
13 However, the distance coeﬃcient becomes positive and signiﬁcant. This can possibly indicate higher
demand for Canadian agricultural goods in more distant countries.
14of unobservable country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect motivates time diﬀerentiation of the regression
equation (1) to remove it:14
∆ln(Xict)=β0 + β1FTAi + β2∆ln(Yit)+β3∆ERit + εict
where ∆Zit = Zi,2005 − Zi,1997. This simple speciﬁcation is augmented with other vari-
ables:
∆ln(Xict)=β0 + β1FTAi + β2∆ln(Yit)+β3∆ERit+
+β4∆ALi + β5 ln(Di)+β6ComLangi + β7Borderi+
+β8Llockedi + β9Islandi + εict
(2)
The estimator for FTAdummy, which takes the value of one for Canada-Chile country-
pair observations, is an adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator of the eﬀect of an FTA,
where the control group is a set of countries that have no free arrangements with Canada. In
the benchmark speciﬁcation we look at the change in the growth rate of Canadian agricultural
trade with Chile relative to the growth rate of imports from other countries during the period
1997-2005 when the Chilean market was completely liberalized for Canada. These results are
not very diﬀerent from the analysis in level form: the ﬂow of Chilean exports to Canada has
increased by around 60 percent as a result of the agreement, while the eﬀect of the CCFTA
on Canadian exports is insigniﬁcant.
One of the possible reasons for the asymmetric eﬀect of the CCFTA on agricultural trade
between member countries is the diﬀerence in tariﬀ elimination schedules. In 1997, Canada
and Chile started with very similar protection levels for their agricultural products. As it
14 Diﬀerencing out the country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (country ﬁxed eﬀects are constant over the two periods
so diﬀerencing will cancel them out)
15was mentioned earlier, Chile applied a uniform 11 percent import tariﬀ to imports of all
products from all countries, which fell to 7.5 percent by 2005, the last year of our sample.
The Canadian simple average tariﬀ for agricultural industries was 7 percent in 1997, while the
applied import tariﬀ weighted by trade shares was 11.2 percent that declined to 4.6 percent
in 2005. By 2005, 65 percent of all HS6 categories of Chilean exports were exported duty-free
into Canada, while only 35 percent of Canadian HS6 categories received duty-free treatment
in Chile. As a result of this prolonged liberalization of the Chilean agricultural sector, the
eﬀect of the CCFTA may not be completely reﬂected in the data currently available.
If a diﬀerent time path for tariﬀ reductions is the only reason for observed asymmetry
in the eﬀect of the CCFTA on bilateral trade, then the elasticity of Canadian imports and
exports with respect to the FTA tariﬀ preferences should not be diﬀerent. To verify if
this is the case, we used an econometric speciﬁcation that comes from a reduced form of
microeconomic partial equilibrium model (Clausing, 2001). The basic empirical speciﬁcation
takes the following form:
∆ln(Xct)=β0 + β1∆tariffct + βT [Year Effects]+εct (3)
where c denotes industry and t denotes time. Xct is the value of Canadian industry c
imports from (exports to) Chile at year t, tariffct is the Canadian (Chilean) ad-valorem free
tariﬀ for the industry c imports from Canada (exports to Chile) at year t,a n d∆ denotes
the one year time-diﬀerencing.
Table 6 presents estimation results for speciﬁcation (3). The GLS estimates in columns
(5)-(6) show no eﬀect of Chilean tariﬀ preferences granted to Canadian exports to Chile: the
16coeﬃcient is not only positive but also insigniﬁcant. Controlling for industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects in columns (3)-(4), such as diﬀerences in initial tariﬀs, factor intensities, and industry-
speciﬁc comparative advantage, seems to have little eﬀect on the sign of β1.I ti ss i g n i ﬁcant
atthe 10 percent conﬁdence level, suggesting that the reduction in Canadian exports to
Chile was greater in those sectors where the CCFTA tariﬀ cuts were deeper. Therefore,
there is little evidence that tariﬀ preferences granted by Chile for Canadian imports under
the CCFTA have promoted an increase in Canadian agricultural exports to that country.
At the same time, in the speciﬁcation with Canadian imports from Chile in columns
(1)-(4), the eﬀect of the CCFTA tariﬀ reduction has a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect on agri-
cultural trade. The coeﬃcient on the Canadian tariﬀ change toward Chilean imports in
the speciﬁcation with industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is −0.75, which implies a 75 percent
increase in imports in response to a 1 percent tariﬀ reduction. This number seems to be
very large, given that the average tariﬀ change for Chilean agricultural products from 1997
to 2005 was 4.5 percent and the average increase in imports for the same period was only
87 percent. For example, 1 percent tariﬀ reduction for the average country, controlling for
country-speciﬁc characteristics, is responsible for only a 28 percent increase in imports. This
suggests that there must be some factors other than tariﬀ changes that aﬀected positively
Canadian imports from Chile (for example, there may be a sharp decline in import quota
restriction going parallel with tariﬀ reduction, and both eﬀects will be attributed to tariﬀs).
In general the magnitude seems to be overestimated, but the sign and signiﬁcance are very
robust across speciﬁcations. Therefore, the data conﬁrms that Canadian and Chilean agri-
cultural exporters responded diﬀerently to trade liberalization made available by the FTA.
17While the CCFTA stimulated Chilean farmers to increase their sales to Canada, we found
no eﬀect of the CCFTA tariﬀ preferences on Canadian agricultural exports to Chile. This
result is robust to the inclusion of other controls and conﬁrms the predictions found in the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis of the CCFTA on Canadian trade with Chile.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we estimated the eﬀect of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement on the vol-
ume of agricultural trade between member countries. Since the CCFTA was implemented in
1997, the value of Chilean agricultural exports to Canada steadily increased, while Canadian
exports to Chile shrank. In the ﬁrst part of the analysis we estimated the trade eﬀect of the
CCFTA using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, based on a gravity model and controlling
for diﬀerent factors that may aﬀect the bilateral volume of trade such as appreciation of
the Canadian dollar. We found that the introduction of the CCFTA has increased bilateral
trade, especially Chilean exports to Canada: exports of an average industry increased by an
additional 25 - 35 percent as a result of the FTA. At the same time, we found no evidence
of the CCFTA eﬀect on the value of Canadian exports to Chile.
In the second part of the analysis we measured the sensitivity of bilateral trade ﬂows to
tariﬀ preferences proposed by CCFTA and found similar results: each one percent of Cana-
dian tariﬀ preferences granted to Chile raised Chilean exports to Canada, while Canadian
exports of agricultural products have not responded to tariﬀ preferences received in Chilean
markets. 15
15 In the absence of the CCFTA agreement would Canadian exports to Chile have fallen more than
they did? The point is well understood by the Canadian Wheat Board. Quoting from a news arti-
cle (http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=5981) Spokesperson [of the Canadian Wheat Board]
Maureen Fitzhenry says that Canada need only look at countries where it doesnt have agreements to grasp
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20Table 1a: Trade Patterns in Agriculture: Comparing Chile with other Latin American Countries
 (,000 Canadian Dollars) 
Canadian Imports  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Argentina Venezuela Latin 
America* 
All Countries 
1996 319152  222637  238855  99279 3648  1494284  14045092 
1997 368258  247501  247280  115754 6951  1717872  15678826 
2000 361833  272317  240694  169806 3766  1803102  18636002 
2004 450318  413021  231866  108022 2464  2059958  21318089 
2006 638956  498600  317987  149941 1155  2524865  23533758 
GROWTH (96-04)  0.41  0.86 -0.03  0.09 -0.32 0.38 0.52 
 Market Share in 1996   0.21  0.15  0.16  0.07 0.00  1   
 Market Share in 2006  0.25  0.20  0.13  0.06 0.00  1   
Growth in Share  0.18  0.33 -0.21 -0.11 -0.81  0   
            
* Excluding Mexico      
 
Table 1b: Trade Patterns in Agriculture: Comparing Chile with other Latin American Countries
 (,000 Canadian Dollars) 
Canadian Exports 
Venezuela Colombia Chile  Brazil Argentina 
Latin 
America* All  Countries 
1996  235550 214642 164605 393840 12911 1433402 22907265
1997  220639  187424 92033 270752 32321  1393782 25362671 
2000  223480 153423 83351 87929 8848 1130942 27342995
2004  212192 178930 58345 38678 9717 1114769 31018006
2006  193407 138941 55687 49493 6211 1015057 31668538
GROWTH (96-04)  -0.04 -0.05 -0.37 -0.86 -0.70  -0.20  0.22 
 Market Share in 1996   0.164 0.150 0.115 0.275 0.009  1   
 Market Share in 2006  0.191 0.137 0.055 0.049 0.006 1 
Growth in Share  0.159 -0.086 -0.522 -0.823 -0.321  0 
            
* Excluding Mexico      
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22Table 2a: Trade Patterns in Agriculture: Top 10 Import Commodities  
Imports 1996 2005  growth  96 share 05 share
HS 08 - Edible Fruits and Nuts  124357778 254500309 105% 56% 58%
HS 22 - Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar  38520926 66316301 72% 17% 15%
HS 23 - Residues and Waste from the Food Industries, and Prepared Fodder  18929606 3313762 -82% 9% 1%
HS 20 - Preparations of Vegetables, Fruit, Nuts or Other Parts   21493513 14372519 -33% 10% 3%
HS 03 - Fish, Crustaceans, Molluscs and Other Aquatic Invert.  10289210 68254846 563% 5% 15%
HS 01 - Live Animals  685524 19911 -97% 0% 0%
HS 10 - Cereals  236983 11326720 4680% 0% 3%
HS 07 - Edible Vegetables and Certain Roots and Tubers  2269622 3339142 47% 1% 1%
HS 16 - Meat, Fish and Seafood Preparations  800265 1862159 133% 0% 0%
HS 09 - Coffee, Tea, Maté and Spices  2238275 1144739 -49% 1% 0%
 
 
Table 2b: Trade Patterns in Agriculture: Top 10 Export Commodities 
 
Exports  1996 2005  growth   96 share  05 share 
HS 10 - Cereals  149332133 22218353 -85% 91%  52%
HS 07 - Edible Vegetables and Certain Roots and Tubers  7196364 8809758 22% 4%  21%
HS 20 - Preparations of Vegetables, Fruit, Nuts or Other Parts of plants 1305993 298045 -77% 1% 1%
HS 17 - Sugars and Sugar Confectionery  1282451 230255 -82% 1% 1%
HS 02 - Meat and Edible Meat Offal  1267386 2229779 76% 1%  5%
HS 24 - Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes  1652032 15855 -99% 1%  0%
HS 23 - Residues and Waste from the Food Industries, and Prepared  Fodder 93005 980655 954% 0%  2%
HS 04 - Dairy Produce, Eggs, Honey and Other Similar Edible Products  1320352 1127529 -15% 1% 3%
HS 15 - Fats, Oils, Their Cleavage Products and Waxes  278733 102545 -63% 0%  0%
HS 11 - Products of the Milling Industry; Malt, Starches, Insulin and Wheat 
Gluten  18387 228524 1143% 0% 1%
HS 12 - Oil Seeds, Oleaginous Fruits, Industrial or Medicinal Plants, 
Straw,Fodder  67565 525421 678% 0%  1%
HS 19 - Preparations of Cereals, Flour, Starch or Milk  44667 991533 2120% 0%  2%  
 
23Table 3: Effect of CCFTA on Canadian Imports 
  OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Chili Dummy  0.3304*** -0.1224 0.7257*** 0.5845*** 0.5802*** 0.4070***
(0.1171) (0.1101) (0.1066) (0.0990) (0.1213)  (0.1139)
FTA dummy  0.3003** 0.4682*** 0.2172* 0.2208*** 0.2426  0.2935* 
(0.1493) (0.1394) (0.1257) (0.0856) (0.1823)  (0.1666)
%Δ(Exchange 
rate) 
 0.0054  0.1384***
  (0.0503)  (0.0460)
log(GDP) 
    -0.0491*** -0.0503*** -0.0348*** -0.0413*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0078)  (0.0073)
Furtalizer   0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***  0.0000***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)
log(Ag. land)      0.1400*** 0.1967*** 0.1302*** 0.1719*** 
    (0.0082) (0.0077) (0.0093) (0.0088) 
Ag. land per 
worker 
 13.3777*** 2.8032* 15.0397***  1.9755
  (1.5690) (1.4932) (1.7283)  (1.6654)
log(Distance) 
    -0.0604*  -0.0637* -0.0976** -0.0766* 
    (0.0364) (0.0347) (0.0408) (0.0394) 
Common 
language 
 -0.2123*** -0.1548*** -0.1859***  -0.1782***
  (0.0423) (0.0391) (0.0471)  (0.0441)
Landlocked   -0.7447*** -0.7911*** -0.4669***  -0.5155***
    (0.0868) (0.0802) (0.1052) (0.0983) 
Island 
 -0.0610 0.0209 -0.0395 0.0504
  (0.0463) (0.0427) (0.0515)  (0.0481)
Constant  11.2851*** 11.0899*** 9.9688*** 9.3612*** 10.0655*** 9.4268***
(0.0463) (0.0436) (0.3028) (0.2946) (0.3397) (0.3341) 
R2 0.0189  0.0151 0.0405 0.0421 0.0432 0.0392
N 119927  119927 39332 39332 29496  29496
Notes: The dependent variable is log of Canadian imports value (annual). Standard errors in 
parentheses. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include industry fixed effects. All specifications include 
time fixed effects.  
24Table 4: Effect of CCFTA – Difference Control Group 
CONTROL GROUP FTA dummy   
Central and South America  0.515* (0.346) 
Asia-Pacific  0.346*** (0.135) 
European Union  0.387*** (0.147) 
West Africa  -0.193 (0.357) 
North Africa  -0.291 (0.376) 
East-South Africa  0.359 (0.311) 
Middle East  0.269 (0.174) 
High Income  0.574*** (0.153) 
Mid-up Income  0.244* (0.148) 
Mid-low Income  -0.024 (0.131) 
Low Income  -0.091 (0.155) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of Canadian exports value (annual). Standard errors in parentheses.
25Table 5: Effect of CCFTA on Canadian Exports 
 OLS  FE OLS FE OLS FE
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Chili Dummy  0.1330 -0.2482* -0.0789 -0.0615 -0.0826 0.0333 
(0.1583) (0.1415) (0.1261) (0.1034) (0.1694)  (0.1363)
FTA dummy  -0.1493 0.1250 0.1770 0.2079 0.0191 -0.0410
(0.1882) (0.1680) (0.1739) (0.1421) (0.2259) (0.1795) 
%Δ(Exchange 
rate) 
     -0.0758  -0.1150*** 
  (0.0531)  (0.0425)
log(GDP)   0.0357*** 0.0412***  0.0297***  0.0342***
  (0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0073)  (0.0060)
Furtalizer     -0.0000  0.0000**  0.0000  0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)
log(Ag. land)   0.1581*** 0.1197***  0.2072***  0.1581***
    (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0085) (0.0071) 
Ag. land per 
worker 
   -11.2879*** -12.4622***  -15.9266***  -17.4019*** 
    (0.8435) (0.6981) (1.3476) (1.0970) 
log(Distance) 
 0.1229*** 0.1241***  0.1832***  0.2067***
  (0.0260) (0.0220) (0.0355)  (0.0299)
Common 
language 
   -0.0534  -0.1243***  0.0441  -0.0867** 
    (0.0351) (0.0294) (0.0511) (0.0424) 
Landlocked    -0.2879*** -0.5439*** -0.4899*** -0.7542***
  (0.0685) (0.0567) (0.1152)  (0.0936)
Island   -0.5742*** -0.2177*** -0.6564*** -0.2383***
    (0.0359) (0.0301) (0.0500) (0.0415) 
Constant  10.7359*** 10.7044*** 7.9304*** 7.9347*** 7.6473*** 7.6378***
(0.0386) (0.0346) (0.2273) (0.1938) (0.3097)  (0.2628)
R2 0.0369 0.0278 0.1051 0.0830 0.1364 0.1041
N  126955  126955  35691 35691 18815 18815 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of Canadian exports value (annual). Standard errors in 
parentheses. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include industry fixed effects. All specifications include 
time fixed effects.  
26Table 6 : Effect of CCFTA Tariff Cuts on Canadian Exports 
Dependent variable:  Imports growth rate Exports growth rate
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
%Δtariff -1.1094*** -1.0980*** -0.7456*  -0.7361*  0.1546  0.2054* 
  (0.4151) (0.4084) (0.4317) (0.4222) (0.1070)  (0.1226)
%Δtariff other countries  0.0465 0.0570  
   (0.0451)  (0.0479)     
Constant  0.2456 0.2465 0.3251 0.3479 -0.2167  0.2667 
  (0.2285) (0.2264) (0.2342) (0.2308) (0.3235)  (0.3517)
Industry fixed effects  NO NO YES YES NO YES
R2 0.0071 0.0080 0.0096 0.0110 0.0332 0.0387
Number  of  observations  2260 2153 2260 2153  640  640 
Notes: The dependent variable is an annual growth rate of Canadian imports in columns (1)-(4) and 
annual growth rate of Canadian exports in columns (5) and (6). Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 
(2), (4) and (6) include industry fixed effects. All specifications include time fixed effects. 
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